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I. INTRODUCTION
The first world report on disability stated that “[m]ore than one
billion people in the world live with some form of disability, of
whom nearly [two hundred] million experience considerable
difficulties in functioning.” 1 This number amounts to about fifteen
* Legal Advisor of the Deputy Prosecutor of Colombia. Universidad Externado de
Colombia with Specialization in Criminal and Criminological Sciences and
Liability and Damages. L.L.M. in Human Rights and Criminal Justice in Utrecht
University.
1. World Report On Disability, WORLD HEALTH ORG., xi (2011),
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789240685215_eng.pdf.
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percent of the world’s population. 2 These statistics clearly show that
persons with disabilities are an important part of the population and
can be considered the largest minority in the world. 3 This percentage
is similar in Europe, where there are about 80 to 120 million persons
with disabilities. 4 According to statistics, “one in four Europeans has
a family member with a disability.” 5
The right to liberty of people with intellectual and psychosocial
disabilities in Europe is enshrined in article 5(1)(e) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). 6 This Convention was
drafted in 1950 and, sixty-four years later, it maintains the same
wording despite significant changes in international human rights
law. A rigid reading of this article leads to criminalizing people with
intellectual or psychosocial disabilities and violates the dignity of
those with disabilities.
The ECHR refers to “persons of unsound mind.” 7 It does not,
however, define “unsound mind” despite the importance of
determining who falls within the ECHR’s scope. According to
Oxford Dictionary, the term “unsound” can have different meanings.
When referring to a person, it means, “[n]ot physically sound;
unhealthy, diseased; suffering from wounds or injuries.” 8 It is also
2. Id. at 261 (stating that the estimated one billion plus people living with a
disability in 2010 constituted about fifteen percent of the world’s population at the
time).
3. See International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:
Some Facts About Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 14-25, 2006),
http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/pdfs/factsheet.pdf.
4. See Council Europe, Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights and
Disability: Equal Rights for All, at 3 (Oct. 20, 2008), available at https://wcd.coe.
int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?Index=no&command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet
&InstranetImage=1370848&SecMode=1&DocId=1318344&Usage=2 [hereinafter
Equal Rights].
5. Facts and Figures About Disability, EUR. DISABILITY FORUM,
http://www.edf-feph.org/Page_Generale.asp?DocID=12534&id=1&langue=EN
(last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
6. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14, art. 5, entered into force June
1, 2010, E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR] (“Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
cases and in accordance with procedure proscribed by law . . . the lawful
detention . . . of persons of unsound mind.”).
7. Id. art. 5(1)(e).
8. Unsound Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/
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defined as “[n]ot mentally sound or normal; not sane.” 9
The term “unsound mind” is grossly overbroad and implies that
such persons are not ‘normal.’ What is normality? Are persons of
“unsound minds” those who have a mental illness? Are they those
who have an intellectual 10 or psychosocial 11 disability? Does the
ECHR’s definition include patients in a coma? Whether article
5(1)(e) encompasses all of these categories is unclear. A person who
has an “unsound mind” is supposedly someone who cannot exercise
self-determination, unlike a person of a “sound mind,” which some
define as “[the] state of a man’s mind which is adequate to reason
and comes to a judgment upon ordinary subjects, like other rational
men.” 12

II. BACKGROUND: THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS
WITH DISABILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(“CRPD”) does not use the term “unsound mind.” 13 Instead, CRPD
refers to persons with disabilities as part of a paradigm shift in the
social perception of disabilities.14 Article 1 of the CRPD establishes
that “[p]ersons with disabilities include those who have long-term

view/Entry/218175?rskey=BWCa8R&result=7&isAdvanced=false# (last visited
Aug. 7, 2014).
9. Id.
10. See Council Europe, Comm’r for Human Rights, Who Gets to Decide?
Right to Legal Capacity for Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial
Disabilities, at 6, (Feb. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Who Gets to Decide?], available at
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?Index=no&command=com.instrane
t.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2343832&SecMode=1&DocId=2050970&Usage
=2 (“Persons with intellectual disabilities . . . include those who experience
difficulties in their intellectual functioning, for example persons with Down’s
syndrome.”).
11. See id. (“Persons with psychosocial disabilities include those who are
diagnosed with and/or experiencing mental health problems, e.g. bipolar disorder,
autism[,] or schizophrenia.”).
12. Sound Mind Definition, LECTRIC L. LIBR., http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/
s163.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
13. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106,
pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD].
14. See id. (utilizing a “holistic approach” to ensure social development,
human rights, and non-discrimination).
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physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in
interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others.” 15 The CRPD,
which entered into force in 2008, is the latest United Nations human
rights treaty. 16 More countries signed the CRPD on the day of its
introduction than any other UN convention. 17 So far, 158 States have
signed the CRPD and 161 have ratified it. 18 Almost all the European
States have signed the CRPD although a few holdouts remain. 19
Persons with disabilities are equally entitled to the rights of those
who do not have disabilities. 20 In practice, however, many states
deprive people with disabilities of many rights that most take for
granted. For this reason, a specific convention was necessary. 21
The Preamble of the CRPD is significant because it emphasizes
equality and human dignity as fundamental values and principles of

15. Id. art. 1.
16. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=14&pid=150 (last visited Aug. 4,
2014) (providing that the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
and its Optional Protocol was adopted on December 13, 2006 and opened for
signature on May 30, 2007).
17. See id. (commenting that the Convention had eighty-two signatories).
18. See Convention and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications,
UNITED NATIONS , http://www.un.org/disabilities/countries.asp?navid=12&pid=
166 (last visited Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter CRPD Signatories] (noting twentythree countries ratified but did not sign the Convention).
19. Id.; see also CRPD and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications,
UNITED NATIONS (July 2014) [hereinafter CRPD Map], http://www.un.org/
disabilities/documents/maps/enablemap.jpg (showing that Finland, Iceland,
Ireland, Monaco, and the Netherlands have not yet ratified).
20. See Human Rights and Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/humanrights.htm#_ftn1 (last visited
Aug. 17, 2014) (“The rights of individuals with disabilities are grounded in a
human rights framework based on the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, international covenants on human rights[,] and
related human rights instruments.”).
21. See Why a Convention?, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/disabilities/
convention/questions.shtml (last visited Aug. 17, 2014) (asserting that legally
binding treaty obligations are required to ensure that persons with disabilities
receive the rights that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees
them).
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human rights to which people with disabilities are entitled. The
Preamble provides that:
Recalling the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations
which recognize the inherent dignity and worth and the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that . . . everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth therein, without distinction of any kind,
Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility, interdependence and
interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and the
need for persons with disabilities to be guaranteed their full enjoyment
without discrimination[.] 22

Further, it recognizes that persons with disabilities are diverse and
that discriminating against any person on the basis of disability is a
violation of the inherent dignity and worth of a person. 23 The
Preamble also highlights the fact that persons with disabilities
“continue to face barriers in their participation as equal members of
society and violations of their human rights in all parts of the
world,” 24 which creates a profound social disadvantage. 25 Moreover,
the CRPD establishes eight guiding principles, which include:
respect for inherent dignity, non-discrimination, respect for
difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of
human diversity and humanity, and full and effective participation
22. CRPD, supra note 13, pmbl. (emphasis omitted).
23. Id. pmbl. (i) (“Recognizing further the diversity of persons with
disabilities.”) (emphasis omitted); id. pmbl. (h); see art. 2 (defining discrimination
as “any distinction, exclusion[,] or restriction on the basis of disability which has
the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment[,] or
exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil[,] or any other field.”);
id. pmbl. (j) (“Recognizing also that discrimination against any person on the basis
of disability is a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the human person.”)
(emphasis omitted).
24. Id. pmbl. (k).
25. See id. art. (y) (“Convinced that a comprehensive and integral international
convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with
disabilities will make a significant contribution to redressing the profound social
disadvantage of persons with disabilities and promote their participation in the
civil, political, economic, social and cultural spheres with equal opportunities, in
both developing and developed countries.”) (emphasis omitted).
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and inclusion in society. 26
Article 5 of the CRPD specifically addresses equality and nondiscrimination and provides that States should consider persons with
disabilities as “equal before and under the law” and give them “equal
protection and benefit of the law.” 27 Accordingly, pursuant to article
8, parties must “adopt immediate, effective[,] and appropriate
measures: . . . [t]o combat stereotypes, prejudices[,] and harmful
practices relating to persons with disabilities . . . in all areas of
life.” 28
Article 14 enshrines the right to liberty and security of person, 29
which includes the obligation of parties to ensure that persons with
disabilities are not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily,
and that any deprivation of liberty is consistent with the spirit of the
law. 30 Significantly, this provision also requires states to ensure “that
the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of
liberty.” 31 It also obligates States to ensure that persons with
disabilities deprived of their liberty through any process are treated
in accordance with international human rights. 32
The CRPD also establishes the right of people with disabilities to
live independently and to be included in the community. 33 Article 19
specifically requires States to take effective and appropriate
measures to ensure that people with disabilities have the opportunity
to choose their place of residence and cohabitants on an equal basis
with others. 34 It also serves to prevent State parties from isolating or
26. CRPD, supra note 13, art. 3(a) (“Respect for inherent dignity, individual
autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of
persons”); see id. art. 3(b); id. art. 3(c); see id. art. 3(d).
27. Id. art. 3(a); see id. art. 5(1).
28. See id. art. 8 (1).
29. See id. art. 14.
30. Id. art. 14(1)(b).
31. Id.
32. See id. art. 14(2) (“States Parties shall ensure that if persons with
disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal
basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human
rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of
the present Convention, including by provision of reasonable accommodation.”).
33. See CRPD, supra note 13, art. 19 (“States Parties . . . shall take effective
and appropriate measures to facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of
this right and their full inclusion and participation in the community . . .”).
34. See id. art. 19(a) (mandating State Parties to ensure that persons with
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segregating people with disabilities from the community. 35

III. AN “UNSOUND MIND”: THE ANTIQUATED
TERMINOLOGY OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT
While the CRPD is a progressive step in international law, the
shocking language of article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR remains unchanged
since 1950. This anachronism continues to impinge on the equitable
treatment of people of disabilities. It uses terms like persons of
“unsound mind,” which assumes the incapacity of the person due to
the insanity of his or her mind. 36 Article 5(1)(e) allows States to
lawfully deprive someone who qualifies as having an “unsound
mind” of their right to liberty. 37 This is a consequence of
emphasizing what is known as the “medical model” of assessing
disabilities because it assumes ‘normalizing’ these persons is
necessary, even if it requires depriving liberty since such
deprivations are purportedly for the good of the person.
This rationale frames people with disabilities as “objects rather
than subjects in their own right.” 38 The “medical model” locates the
“problem” of disability within the person, asserting that such persons
could be “fixed” through medicine or rehabilitation, whereas the
disabilities have an opportunity to choose where and with whom they live, equal to
the opportunities available to persons without disabilities).
35. See id. art. 19(b).
36. Cf. Sound Mind Definition, supra note 12 (defining the sound mind as one
that is sufficient to “adequate[ly] reason and comes to a judgment upon ordinary
subjects”).
37. See ECHR, supra note 6, art. 5 (“Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
cases and in accordance with procedure proscribed by law . . . the lawful
detention . . . of persons of unsound mind”).
38. See Gerard Quinn & Theresia Degener, Human Rights and Disability: The
Current Use and Future Potential of United Nations Human Rights Instruments in
the Context of Disability, UNITED NATIONS OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS.
13 (2002), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HRDisabilityen.pdf
(arguing that putting human rights “values into practice in the context of
disability” is a “problem that stems largely from the relative invisibility of people
with disabilities in the past[, where] [t]hey tended to be viewed as objects rather
than subjects in their own right and the legal protections normally associated with
the rule of law were either not applied at all or were severely curtailed.”).
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“charity model” provides that only welfare programs or charity can
care for them. 39
International law slowly changed how it framed the rights of
people with disabilities and eventually shifted to a rights-based
approach. 40 Fortunately, most European States, including the
European Union, have already ratified the CRPD. 41 The Council of

39. See id. (“The ‘medical model’ of disability has frequently been contrasted
in recent years with the ‘human rights’ model. The medical model focuses on
persons’ medical traits such as their specific impairments. This has the effect of
locating the ‘problem’ of disability within the person.”); Monitoring the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNITED NATIONS OFF. HIGH
COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS. 8 (2010), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/Disabilities_training_17EN.pdf (“When disability is perceived in this
way, society’s responses are restricted to only one of two paths: individuals can be
‘fixed’ through medicine or rehabilitation (medical approach); or they can be cared
for, through charity or welfare programmes (charity approach).”).
40. See The United Nations and Persons with Disabilities Chronology: 19451980, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=124 (last
visited Aug. 11, 2014); The United Nations and Persons with Disabilities
Chronology: 1980’s-Present, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/disabilities/
default.asp?id=125 (last visited Aug. 11, 2014) (highlighting the proclamation of
the Decade of Disabled Persons as 1983-1993, the 1989 adoption of the Tallinn
Guidelines for Action in Human Resources Development in the Field of Disability,
1991 adoption of the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness
and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, representing as a partial shift from
the medical approach, and 1993 issuing of the Standard Rules on the Equalization
of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities); see also Decision 2001/903/EC, of
the Council of 3 Dec. 2001on the European Year of People with Disabilities 2003,
2001 O.J. (L 335) 15, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001D0903&from= (identifying 2003 as the European Year
of People with Disabilities to raise public awareness about the issue); Ad Hoc
Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1423 (last visited
Aug. 11, 2014) (commenting on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee “to
consider proposals for a comprehensive and integral international convention to
promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, based on the
holistic approach in the work done in the fields of social development, human
rights and non-discrimination and taking into account the recommendations of the
Commission on Human Rights and the Commission for Social Development.”).
41. See CRPD Signatories, supra note 18 (providing the dates of signing and
ratification by U.N. members); see also European Comm’n, United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/discrimination/disabilities/convention/index_en.htm (last updated Aug.
8, 2014) (noting that the Convention entered into force with respect to the EU on
January 22, 2011).
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Europe has prioritized the rights of persons with disabilities and
issued recommendations aiming to ensure that persons with
disabilities fully participate in society. 42 In Recommendation 1592, 43
the Council recognized that several fundamental rights were still
inaccessible for persons with disabilities in Europe and
recommended promoting and implementing equal status, inclusion,
full citizenship, and the right to choose. 44 This initiative
demonstrated a shift in policy from an institutional approach to a
holistic approach that considers persons with disabilities as citizens
rather than patients. 45 Recommendation 1592 validated not only the
rights of persons with disabilities but also the rights of their families,
taking into account that families can provide a caring home “as a
much better and more natural alternative to life in large-scale
institutions.”46

42. See Per Sjögren, Chairman, Ministers’ Deputies Council Europe, Welcome
Address at the Swedish Conference on U.N. Disability Convention: Protecting and
Promoting the Rights of Persons With Disabilities in Europe: Towards Full
Participation, Inclusion and Empowerment 27 (Oct. 29, 2008), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/socsp/Protecting_and_promoting_the_right
s_of_persons_with_disabilities_-_complete_with_cover1.pdf; see, e.g., Eur. Parl.
Ass., Rehabilitation Policies for the Disabled, Recommendation No. 1185, ¶ 6(ii)
(1992), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/Adopted
Text/ta92/EREC1185.htm [hereinafter Recommendation 1185] (calling on member
States to encourage disabled persons to actively participate in family and
community life and the organization of their own lives and provide for proper
representation if their interests or needs are not met); Eur. Parl. Ass., Towards Full
Social Inclusion of People with Disabilities, Recommendation No. 1592, ¶¶ 10,
11(d) (2003), available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/
adoptedtext/ta03/erec1592.htm [hereinafter Recommendation 1592] (instructing
member States to institute programs that will encourage the social inclusion of
people with disabilities); see also Eur. Parl. Ass., The Protection of the Human
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Mental Disorder, Recommendation
Rec(2004)10, arts. 4(1), 9 (2004), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/health
bioethic/texts_and_documents/Rec(2004)10_e.pdf [hereinafter Recommendation
Concerning Rights and Dignity] (proclaiming that persons with mental disorders
should be able to “exercise all their civil and political rights”).
43. See generally Recommendation 1592, supra note 42.
44. See id. ¶ 2 (noting that rights provided in ECHR were still inaccessible to
disabled persons in 2003); id. ¶ 3 (stating that it should be the overall objective of
the European Council to guarantee “equal political, social, economic and cultural
rights” to persons with disabilities).
45. See id. ¶ 5 (describing the shift from considering disabled individuals as
“patients” to “citizens” with a right to individual support and self-determination).
46. Id. ¶ 4.
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The Council also issued Action Plan 2006-2015, which, like
Recommendation 1592, promotes the rights and full participation of
persons with disabilities in society. 47 The plan recognizes the right of
persons with disabilities to live independently as part of a community
and aims to raise awareness to eliminate stigmatization and
discriminatory behavior against people with disabilities. 48 It also
focused on the individual as “central to a coherent, integrated
approach which respects the human rights, fundamental freedoms[,]
and dignity of all disabled individuals.” 49 The plan incorporates the
following principles: non-discrimination, equality of opportunities,
full participation in society for all persons with disabilities, respect
for difference and acceptance of disability as part of human diversity,
dignity, and individual autonomy including the right of selfdetermination. 50
Similarly, the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of
Europe has issued several papers on disability policies. 51 In 2008, the
Commissioner departed from the usual European agenda and stated
that people with disabilities still face discrimination all over Europe
and that it is incorrect to see them as “objects of concern.” 52 In
47. Eur. Parl. Ass., The Council of Europe Action Plan to Promote the Rights
and Full Participation of People with Disabilities in Society: Improving the
Quality of Life of People with Disabilities in Europe 2006-2015, Recommendation
Rec(2006)5 (2006), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=986865.
48. See id. § 1.3 (stating that independence is associated with living in the
community and advocating for the use of “accessible and objective information” to
combat the stigmatization of and discrimination against persons with disabilities).
49. Id. § 2.2.
50. Id. § 2.7.
51. See generally Council Europe Comm’r for Human Rights, The Right of
People with Disability to Live Independently and Be Included in the Community,
(June 2012), available at http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/source/prems/RigtsTo
LiveInCommunity-GBR.pdf [hereinafter Right to Live Independently] (positing
that the right to live independently and live in a community are fundamental rights
that must be extended to persons with disabilities); Who Gets to Decide?, supra
note 10, at 6 (asserting that States must recognize the legal capacity of persons
with disabilities to ensure that they may enjoy the full extent of the rights that
human rights law guarantees them); Thomas Hammarberg, Council Europe
Comm’r Human Rights, Human Rights in Europe: No Grounds for Complacency,
at 128 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/source/prems/
HR-Europe-no-grounds-complacency_en.pdf (arguing that States must act to make
society more inclusive); Equal Rights, supra note 4, at 3.
52. See Equal Rights, supra note 4, at 3 (suggesting a shift is taking place
whereby human rights law no longer considers persons with disabilities as objects
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particular, when recognizing the right to live in the community, the
paper affirmed that life in an institution “almost inevitably leads to
exclusion.” 53 In response, Member States implemented strategies and
approaches to achieve a de-institutionalization process. 54 The
Commissioner’s report considered that while de-institutionalization
protected the rights of the persons living in institutions,
“malpractices, such as keeping persons in bed all day, overmedication[,] and abuse of restraints must be stopped immediately”
and involuntary admission must strictly follow national law and be
subject to judicial review. 55
In 2011, the Human Rights Commissioner issued a paper on
human rights in Europe that addressed the rights of persons with
disabilities. 56 This paper recognized that the rights of persons with
disabilities in Europe are still far from being realized because the law
does not yet reflect society’s change in attitude about the rights of
persons with disabilities. 57 It also referred to persons in psychiatric
institutions in Europe, describing their plight as “shockingly bad”
because authorities often detained persons with disabilities in
inhumane and degrading conditions. 58 The Commissioner explained
that “medication is too often used as the only form of treatment” and
alternatives, such as different forms of therapy, rehabilitiation, and
other activities, are necessary. 59 Yet, “[u]nclear admission and
discharge procedures constitute another problem resulting in what, in
reality, is arbitrary detention.” 60 To confront this situation, the
Commissioner recommended that States stop committing persons to
unsuitable social care institutions and provide resources for
of concern but rather citizens entitled to equal rights).
53. Id. at 8.
54. See id. (pointing out that many European States now prefer community
care over institutionalization).
55. See id. at 9-10 (calling for the protection of the human rights of individuals
living in institutions).
56. See generally Hammarberg, supra note 51, at 127 (positing that legal
policy has relied too heavily on institutionalization).
57. See id. at 15 (calling for a shift from a “charity” approach to a “rightsbased” one).
58. See id. at 130 (recounting institutions whose living conditions are so
egregious that the only legally sufficient remedy is to immediately close them
down).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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“adequate health care, rehabilitation[,] and social services in the
community” instead of institutions.61
The Commissioner described the cruel reality of people with
intellectual and psychosocial disabilities:
[they] continue to face discrimination, stigmatisation and even repression.
They find that their mere existence is seen as a problem, and they have
sometimes been hidden away in remote institutions, or in the back-rooms
of family homes. They have been treated as non-persons whose autonomy
is negotiable and whose decisions are meaningless. 62

This is the reality in a majority of European countries, where there
is a tendency to declare people with disabilities as legally
incapable. 63 Furthermore, the Commissioner emphasized that persons
with intellectual disabilities are still stigmatized and marginalized.
For instance, he highlighted that many people with disabilities are
still detained in inhuman institutions, where they are provided with
little, if any, rehabilitation. 64 These institutions often violate the
rights of those committed by segregating and depriving the liberty of
their patients; these institutions commonly treat patients as
dangerous, give them unnecessary sedatives, and completely isolate
them from the outside world. 65 The stigma that these institutions
create is so severe that many patients are abandoned by their own
families, especially when no alternative care exists. 66
At the end of 2011, the Commissioner of Human Rights of the
Council of Europe intervened as a third party in the case of
Câmpeanu v. Romania before the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”). 67 This case represented a turning point because it was
61. Id. at 132.
62. Id.
63. See Hammarberg, supra note 51, at 134 (asserting that it is common for
many European States to treat people with mental illnesses or intellectual
disabilities as legally incapable).
64. See id. at 137-38 (“During missions to member states, I have had to
conclude . . . that a great number of [persons with intellectual disabilities] continue
to be kept in old-style, inhuman institutions”).
65. Id. at 132, 138.
66. See id.
67. Câmpeanu v. Romania, Third Party Intervention by the Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights, App. No. 47848/08, para. 1 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct.
14, 2011) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-145577 [hereinafter Câmpeanu, Third Party Intervention].
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the first case that resulted in the death of an individual. 68 The
International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights
described the case as being the first to detail the “range of extreme
human rights abuses routinely inflicted upon people with disabilities
placed in long-term stay institutions across Europe.” 69 In the
submission to the ECtHR, the Commissioner argued that society
often discriminates against persons with mental health problems and
intellectual disabilities, 70 and States provide limited possibilities for
persons with disabilities to be heard. 71 Accordingly, the
Commissioner asserted that such discrimination prevents persons
with disabilities from seeking legal redress. 72 States and institutions
failing to prioritize the rights of persons with disabilities often isolate
persons with disabilities, leading to severely detrimental
consequences. 73 The Commissioner concluded that the provisions of
the ECHR should be interpreted in accordance with the CRPD in
keeping with its main purpose. 74

IV. SHIFTING TOWARD THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN A
COMMUNITY
In 2012, the Commissioner issued two additional papers on
persons with disabilities. The first paper discussed legal capacity and
the second focused on the right of persons with disabilities to live
independently and within the community. 75 The first paper discussed
68. Câmpeanu v. Romania, Statement of the Facts, App. No. 47848/08 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Oct. 2, 2008) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-113736.
69. The Centre for Legal Resources On Behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v
Romania, INTERIGHTS, http://www.interights.org/campeanu/index.html (last visited
Aug. 19, 2014).
70. See Câmpeanu, Third Party Intervention, supra note 67, para. 7 (warning
that states must take care to avoid “legislative stereotyping” which can seriously
disadvantage persons with disabilities).
71. See id. paras. 9, 11 (claiming that persons with disabilities can rarely
advocate for their rights, either socially or legally).
72. See id. para. 10 (“[C]ases concerning human rights violations experienced
by people with disabilities are often not brought to courts”).
73. See id. para. 12 (noting that the difficulties faced by disabled persons
increase for those living in institutions where they find themselves isolated from
their families and legally incapacitated).
74. Id. para. 42.
75. Who Gets to Decide?, supra note 10, at 6; see also Right to Live
Independently, supra note 51, at 14 (discussing how this authority is part of a
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the paradigm shift and how it closely relates to equality. The
fundamental rights of persons with disabilities are the same as the
fundamental rights of other persons; nonetheless, these rights must
be interpreted in a manner that fulfills the needs of persons with
disabilities. 76
The Commissioner argued that in light of the ECtHR decision in
Shtukaturov v. Russia, depriving individuals of their legal capacity
may constitute “a serious interference with the individual’s right to
respect for private life” enshrined in article 8 of the ECHR. 77 The
ECtHR previously recognized that legal capacity restrictions could
interfere with the right to private life. 78 However, the Commissioner
argued that, “[s]ince the Court continues to recognise mental disorder
as a possible justification for limiting legal capacity, the European
human rights system has not yet fully incorporated the paradigm shift
envisioned in the CRPD towards granting persons with disabilities a
primary right to support in their decision-making.” 79
In the second issue paper, the Commissioner advocated for the
right of persons with disabilities to live within their community. 80
This paper explained the relationship between this right and other

larger effort to affect the CRPD’s general goals).
76. See Who Gets to Decide?, supra note 10, at 11 (asserting that, in the
human rights paradigm, disability is not a result of the individual’s impairment but
rather “society’s failure to create an inclusive environment.”).
77. See id. at 15; Shtukaturov v. Russia, 2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 360, 377 (2008)
(concluding that the State violated the Petitioner’s right to private life under article
8 of the ECHR by providing him with medical reports that he was unable to
understand and later incapacitating him without providing an explanation); see
also ECHR, supra note 6, art. 8 (“Right to respect for private and family life. 1.
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.”).
78. See, e.g., Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, App. No. 36500/05, paras. 140, 144
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct 13, 2009) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-94985 (concluding that, under specific
circumstances, legal capacity restrictions must be proportionate to comply with the
ECHR’s right to respect for private life under article 8).
79. Who Gets to Decide?, supra note 10, at 16.
80. See generally Right to Live Independently, supra note 51.
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fundamental rights, such as the right to liberty, the right not to be
subjected to torture or ill-treatment, equality, and nondiscrimination. 81 The Commissioner argued that relying on
institutionalization was “a pervasive violation of [the right to live in
the community] which calls for a firm commitment to
deinstitutionalization.” 82 However, the Commissioner acknowledged
that
governments
are
increasingly
recognizing
that
83
deinstitutionalization is necessary.
The Commissioner departed from the definition of an “institution”
that the European Coalition for Community Living previously
adopted:
An institution is any place in which people who has been labeled as
having a disability are isolated, segregated and/or compelled to live
together. An institution is any place in which people do not have, or are
not allowed to exercise control over their lives and their day-to-day
decisions. 84

However, the Commissioner went beyond this definition and
characterized institutions as “total institutions,” which refers to
places where “all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and
under the same central authority.” 85 Individuals in total institutions
are treated in the same way and obliged to comply with the same
daily routines as others in the institution, severely inhibiting any
possibility of self-determination. 86
The right to live within the community goes beyond the right not
to be institutionalized; it requires the support of the community and
the families of persons with disabilities to ensure that persons with
disabilities may actively participate in the community and that their

81. See id. at 5, 11.
82. Id. at 5.
83. See id. at 13 (commenting that governments acknowledge that
deinstitutionalization is inevitable).
84. Right to Live Independently, supra note 51, at 18; see also About ECCL:
What is the European Coalition for Community Living?, EUR. COALITION FOR
COMMUNITY LIVING, http://community-living.info/about-eccl/ (last visited Aug.
15, 2014).
85. Right to Live Independently, supra note 51, at 36 (quoting the well-known
sociologist Ervin Goffman)
86. See id.
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right to self-determination is respected. 87 In any case, the practice of
detaining persons with disabilities in institutions must end because it
violates the right to live in the community, increases the risk of
exploitation, abuse, and violence, and critically interrupts such
person’s ability to fulfill their life plans. 88
The lack of community-based alternatives often continues this
heinous practice. 89 Therefore, the Commissioner recommended
governments to “set deinstitutionalisation as a goal and develop a
transition plan for phasing out institutional options and replacing
them with community-based services, with measurable targets, clear
timetables[,] and strategies to monitor progress.” 90
The most recent speech of the Commissioner at the “Human
Rights and Disability” international symposium on April 2014
highlighted that a huge gap exists between what the law requires and
the reality on the ground, especially with respect to the right to
autonomy and the right to live in the community. 91 He recognized
that “Europe still has a long way to go even to eradicate the most
obvious violations of this right,” such as segregating persons with
disabilities in institutions. 92 Indeed, some countries are still building
new institutions, sometimes even with European Union funds; other
supposedly more progressive countries are building large blocks of
apartment buildings away from city centers that exclusively
accommodate people with disabilities. 93 This may lead to creating
87. See id. at 17, 39–40 (describing the right to live within the community as
including the right to determine where and how to relate to the community).
88. Id. at 31-32, 37–38 (noting that detaining disabled individuals in
institutions violates the right to liberty protected in article 14 of the CRPD and
article 5 of the ECHR); see Right to Live Independently, supra note 51, at 37-38.
89. Right to Live Independently, supra note 51, at 35, 28-39 (explaining that
“high levels of institutionalisation go hand-in-hand with lack of community-based
options”).
90. Id. at 7.
91. See Nils Muižnieks, Comm’r Human Rights, Council of Europe, Keynote
Speech at the International Symposium on Human Rights and Disability:
Monitoring the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Europe 1 (Apr. 1011, 2014), available at https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=
com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2503663&SecMode=1&DocId=2130
702&Usage=2.
92. Id.
93. See id. (providing Denmark as an example of a country that abolished
institutions but is building apartment blocks for disabled persons far from the city
center).
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ghettos, which is another way to discriminate against people with
disabilities.
The European Union has also focused on the rights of persons
with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities. For instance, the
European Commission drafted a coherent set of policies to create a
European Disability Strategy. 94 The European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights also submitted several reports regarding persons
with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities. 95 In 2012, it issued
two reports: “Involuntary Placement and Involuntary Treatment of
Persons with Mental Health Problems” and “Choice and Control:
The Right to Independent Living.” 96 The latter concluded that despite
efforts to deinstitutionalize, large institutions and the institutional
culture itself continue to limit individual autonomy, which also affect
social inclusion and one’s ability to participate in the community. 97
The report also recognized that many people experience stigma,
hostility, and negative attitudes, which contribute to people feeling

94. See European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/disabilities/disabilitystrategy/index_en.ht
m (last updated July 16, 2013) (advocating that European states take steps to
promote the interests of persons with disabilities by ensuring the accessibility to
public areas, participation in public life and leisure activities, equality,
employment opportunities, education and training for the labor market, social
protection, and health care services.).
95. See generally The Right to Political Participation of Persons with Mental
Health Problems and Persons with Intellectual Disabilities, EUR. UNION AGENCY
FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. (Oct. 2010), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_
uploads/1216-Report-vote-disability_EN.pdf (detailing a FRA study about the
level of political participation of persons with disabilities); The Legal Protection of
Persons with Mental Health Problems Under Non-Discrimination Law, EUR.
UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. (2011), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/fra_uploads/1797-FRA-2011-Legal-protection-persons-mental-healthproblems-report_EN.pdf (considering how both international and domestic law
affects the rights of persons with disabilities).
96. Choice and Control: The Right to Independent Living, EUR. UNION
AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. (2012), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
choice_and_control_en_13.pdf; Involuntary Placement and Involuntary Treatment
of Persons with Mental Health Problems, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR
FUNDAMENTAL RTS. (2012) [hereinafter Involuntary Placement and Involuntary
Treatment], http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA-2012-involuntaryplacement-treatment_EN.pdf.
97. See id. at 67 (arguing that, after leaving an institution, the ability of a
person with a disability to live independently is hampered by the difficulty in
finding housing, employment, and educational opportunity).
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isolated and lead to discrimination. 98

V. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
HOVERING ON THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
The ECtHR has tried to respect the rights of persons with
intellectual and psychosocial disabilities by strictly analyzing what
would constitute the “lawful detention . . . . of persons of unsound
mind” under article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR. The Winterwep case 99 is
one of the most important decisions on this matter and set the
precedent for future judgments of the ECtHR. The Court recognized
that the term “persons of unsound mind” does not have a definitive
interpretation; however, it clarified and later reaffirmed that a
person’s views and behaviors, even when they deviate from
prevailing societal norms, cannot be grounds for detaining a
person. 100
Despite this conclusion, in Luberti v. Italy, the Court recognized
that national authorities are entitled to a margin of appreciation when
determining if a person is detained as a “person of unsound mind”
because they evaluate the evidence in every individual case first. 101
98. See id. at 67-68 (noting that negative attitudes further enforce
discrimination and cause isolation of disabled persons).
99. See generally Winterwerp v. Netherlands, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6-7
(1979) (concerning a controversy involving The Netherlands treatment of persons
with disabilities).
100. Id. at 16, 37; see also Rudenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 50264/08, para. 102
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 17, 2014) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-142421 (affirming that, although the definition
of “unsound mind” is an evolving one, it does not permit states to detain
individuals who do not conform to societal moors); R.L. and M.-J.D. v. France,
App. No. 44568/98, para. 114 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 19, 2004) (HUDOC), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-66329 (stating that
article 5(e) cannot be read to allow the detention of an individual on the basis of
his or her ideas or behavior); Herz v. Germany, App. No. 44672/98, para. 47 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. June 12, 2003) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61137 (affirming the Winterwerp principle that an
individual cannot be detained solely because his views or behavior deviate from
predominant social norms).
101. See Luberti v. Italy, 75 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12-13 (1984) (stating that
national authorities shall be allowed to evaluate evidence produced for them from
persons of unsound mind with greater discretion); see also Ruiz Rivera v.
Switzerland, App. No. 8300/06, para. 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18, 2014) (HUDOC),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-141434
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Under the Convention, the Court may only review decisions taken by
national authorities.” 102 However, the Court has established three
minimum requirements that national authorities must fulfill to
lawfully deprive an individual of the liberty for being of “unsound
mind”:
1. The person must be reliably shown to be of “unsound mind”;
2. The mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory
confinement; and
3.The validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of
such a disorder. 103

(stating that, under Herz, national courts have some discretion in deciding which
medical analysis of an individual’s mental condition to credit when multiple
analyses reach contradictory conclusions); Rakevich v. Russia, App. No. 58973/00,
para. 30 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 28, 2003) (HUDOC), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-61414 (reiterating that
national authorities are recognized as having certain discretion when dealing with
persons of “unsound mind.”); X v. United Kingdom, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18
(1981) (affirming that the Winterwerp conditions must be established to lawfully
detain an individual of unsound mind).
102. Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1985)
(stating that the Court is limited to evaluating the legality of a state’s detention to
strictly considering ECHR Article 5(1)(e)). But see De Wilde v. Belgium, 12 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65 (1971) (separate opinion of Judges Balladore Pallierie and
Verdross) (arguing that the Court is unqualified to determine whether a state has
unduly detained a person of “unsound mind” because it does not have jurisdiction
under the ECHR to do so).
103. See Rudenko, App. No. 50264/08 para. 99 (mandating that a state must
conform with the purpose of ECHR by ensuring it does not arbitrarily deprive
individuals of their liberty, including persons of “unsound mind”); Plesó v.
Hungary, App. No. 41242/08, para. 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 2, 2012) (HUDOC),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113293
(holding that a state can only lawfully detain an individual if all alternative
measures would prove insufficient to safeguard the detained individual or the
public at large); R.L. and M.-J.D., App. No. 44568/98 para. 114; Rakevich, App.
No. 58973/00 para. 30 (affirming that a state seeking to detain an individual with a
disability must satisfy the three Winterwerp criteria); Hutchison Reid v. United
Kingdom, 2003-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 18 (reaffirming the Winterwerp criteria for
justifying the detention of a person with an “unsound mind.”); Varbanov v.
Bulgaria, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 225, 240 (reiterating the requirements for a finding
of an unsound mind); Johnson v. United Kingdom, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2391,
2409-10 (restating that, under the ECHR, a state cannot lawfully detain an
individual unless it can reliably show through expert medical evidence that the
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To reliably establish that a person is of an “unsound mind,” there
must be objective medical expertise unless depriving the person’s
liberty is an urgent measure, as determined by national authorities. 104
The Court’s standard leaves a degree of questionable flexibility.
Disability is a concept that depends on social context and no doctor
or scientist may provide expertise on the dangerousness of a person
without being influenced by his or her own passions and social and
cultural experiences. 105 Thus, determining what mandates
compulsory confinement is difficult, as the Court has recognized. 106
This vague and broad criterion based on dangerousness should not be
acceptable in a democratic society in the twenty-first century.
The Court requires States to minimize the restrictions on the right
to liberty, but its wording is tied to article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR. 107
individual is of unsound mind, that the individual’s condition is of a kind or degree
warranting compulsory detention, and that such detention can only last as long as
the detained individual’s condition persists); Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, 93
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1985); Luberti, 75 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12-13 (stating that
national authorities shall be allowed to evaluate evidence produced for them from
persons of unsound mind with greater discretion); X, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18
(outlining the conditions required to lawfully detain an individual of unsound
mind).
104. R.L. and M.-J.D., App. No. 44568/98 para. 114 (recognizing that States
have great latitude when analyzing confinement in urgent cases). But see Ruiz
Rivera, App. No. 8300/06 para. 62 (stating that, per Herz, national courts have
some discretion in deciding which medical analysis of an individual’s mental
condition to credit when multiple analyses reach contradictory conclusions); Herz,
App. No. 44672/98 paras. 46-47, 54 (holding the Court could not substitute its
judgment for a national court’s judgment about whether an individual is of
“unsound mind” in emergency situations).
105. See Joseph E. Kennedy, The Danger of Dangerousness As a Basis for
Incarceration, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 83, 84 (Paul H. Robinson et al.
eds., 2009) (explaining that there is no strict science that can absolutely determine
the potential dangerousness for mentally ill individuals and how the distinction is
merely subjective).
106. Rakevich, App. No. 58973/00 paras. 30, 32 (“[T]he national authorities are
to be recognised as having a certain discretion, since it is in the first place for the
national authorities to evaluate the evidence before them . . . .”).
107. See Rudenko, App. No. 50264/08 para. 103 (“The Court further notes that
the detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is only justified
where other, less severe measures have been considered and found to be
insufficient . . . .”); Glien v. Germany, App. No. 7345/12, para. 85 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Nov. 28, 2013) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-138580 (requiring an individual who claims to be mentally ill
to have documented the disorder when admitted to a hospital, clinic, or other
appropriate institution); Zagidulina v. Russia, App. No. 11737/06, para. 52 (Eur.
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Therefore, in practice, all the requirements established by the Court
to guarantee the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty still refer to
the antiquated and disrespectful view of persons with disabilities.
The Court still assesses its decisions based on the undetermined and
arbitrary concept of “unsound mind.” To make matters worse,
“unsound mind” only relates to the character of the person, not his or
her acts, which lead to criminalizing disability. Since this type of
criminalization is not evident, affected people have even fewer rights
and guarantees than persons who are actually facing criminal
charges. For instance, the ECtHR noted that a valid detention based
on a mental disorder does not automatically mean that whenever an
expert finds that the disorder no longer persists the person must be
immediately and unconditionally discharged from detention. 108 This
shows that persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities
face stigma, which is a source of discrimination and contradictory
with human rights and human dignity.
In criminal law, it is undisputed that a person must be punished for
his or her acts, 109 not his or her personality or character. 110 This
concept derives from the nullum crimen sine actione principle,
providing that criminal law only pursues actions or omissions
exteriorized by a person. 111 This principle guarantees that a person
cannot be punished because of his or her character. 112 This is also
Ct. H.R. May 2, 2013) (HUDOC) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-119043 (recognizing that “individuals suffering from a mental illness
constitute a particularly vulnerable group” and therefore courts must use strict
scrutiny to evaluate their cases); Plesó, App. No. 41242/08 para. 62 (holding that,
given the severity of detention, courts must determine that no other less intrusive
options are available to ensure the safety of the individual and the public).
108. See, e.g., Johnson, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R at 2409 (stating that an
individual who did not display a persistent mental disorder should have been
immediately released).
109. See id. at 95 (stating that a criminal act must be a result of a voluntary
physical act and confer responsibility upon an individual actor for those actions).
110. See R. A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY
IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 62 (2009) (arguing that it is improper to hold people
criminally liable for subjective thoughts, feelings, and other character traits).
111. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 420 (1978)
(expanding on what a voluntary act is and how an act can impose responsibility on
an individual as a means of determining subjective criminal intent).
112. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 116 (6th ed.
2009) (promoting the idea that “[f]orfeiture of life to protect a person from some
minor hurt, loss, or damage would promote honour above respect for life and
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consistent with the cultural pluralism that is characteristic of a rule of
law society. Democracy provides that it is necessary to prohibit
prosecuting and discriminating against a particular group without any
reasons and to respect the otherness of human beings. 113
Although the Court seems to recognize this difference, its
decisions keep punishing persons with intellectual or psychosocial
disabilities for being considered of “unsound mind.” The Ashingdane
v. United Kingdom 114 dissenting opinion argued that no analogy
exists between imprisoning and confining a mental patient because
the two concepts involve very different public policy issues. 115 The
purpose of committing and treating mental patients is to cure them
and protect society from persons who are considered “genuinely
dangerous.” Similarly, the Court has stated that, in a rule of law
society, deprivations of liberty belong to the “criminal” sphere where
depriving a person’s liberty may be imposed as punishment unless its
nature, duration, or manner of execution cannot be “appreciably
detrimental.” 116 Despite the theoretical differences between the two,
depriving a person’s right to liberty on the grounds of having an
“unsound mind,” regardless of their actions, turns disability itself
into a punishment. The terrible conditions in total-institutions, which
often do not provide any treatment or benefit to persons subjected to
limb.”).
113. See Glien v. Germany, App. No. 7345/12, para. 85 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 28,
2013) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx
?i=001-138580 (providing narrow means for depriving liberty); Plesó v. Hungary,
App. No. 41242/08, para. 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 2, 2012) (HUDOC), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113293 (holding that
an individual may only be detained if it has been established that all less intrusive
alternatives to detention are insufficient); Rudenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 50264/08,
para. 102 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 17, 2014) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-142421 (stating that the Court should
find that the deprivation of liberty is necessary before allowing it); Zagidulina v.
Russia, App. No. 11737/06, para. 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2013) (HUDOC),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-119043
(reasoning that strict rules must be applied to detention determinations because
persons with disabilities are a “particularly vulnerable group.”).
114. 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1985) (holding that the petitioner was only
entitled to appear whether the act of detaining the petitioner was lawful, not the
specifics of his detention under article 5 of ECHR).
115. See id. at 30 (Pettiti, dissenting) (“[O]ne cannot reason by analogy between
imprisonment and confinement as a mental patient, the issues of public policy
involved being quite different.”).
116. Engel v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1976).
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them, further highlight how having a disability is a punishment. 117
Being considered of “unsound mind” is a label that society places
on people. Criminological and sociological theories have attempted
to explain social exclusion and criminalization of conduct. Although
the labeling approach did not exist during the drafting of the ECHR,
it became the major theory in the sociology of deviant behavior by
the early 1960s. 118 Labeling includes “naming or the use of a
particular term, degradation processes which officially alter the
actor’s status and the effects these two events may have on the actor
himself or those who know him.” 119 Labeling is “the antithesis of
normalization because it transforms rule breaking into deviance and
essentially normal actors into deviant ones.” 120
States and society have used labeling to deprive the liberty of
persons with disabilities. The aim of depriving a person’s liberty was
to change and ‘normalize’ persons with disabilities, which, in turn,
resulted in isolating them from society. States and society have even
labeled persons with disabilities as dangerous and caused many to
believe that deprivation of liberty is the only way to protect the rest
of the society. Over time, various States sanctioned heinous
treatments, such as lobotomies, electroshock treatment, and
sterilization, which courts later found contrary to human dignity. 121
117. See Involuntary Placement and Involuntary Treatment, supra note 96, at
42 (recounting the experiences of those involuntarily placed in an institution as
frightening, pointing to the lack of control, lack of information, and violent
environment).
118. See Erich Goode, On Behalf of Labeling Theory, 22 SOC. PROBS. 570, 570
(1975) (commenting on the labeling theory and its fundamental flaws).
119. Stuart A. Kirk & Eileen D. Gambrill, The Convergence of the
Interactionist and Behavioral Approaches to Deviance, 3 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE
47, 52 (1975) (citing Dennis L. Wenger & C. Richard Fletcher, The Effect of Legal
Counsel on Admissions to a State Mental Hospital: A Confrontation of
Professions, 10 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 66, 70 (1969); Harold Garfinkel,
Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. SOC. 420, 420 (1956)
(“Any communicative work between persons, whereby the public identity of an
actor is transformed into something looked on as lower in the local scheme of
social types, will be called a ‘status degradation ceremony.’”).
120. Kirk & Gambrill supra note 119, at 52.
121. See Zagidulina, App. No. 11737/06, paras. 52-53 (outlining the protections
the courts have imposed for the mentally ill); Plesó, App. No. 41242/08, para. 62
(holding that detention can only be justified when less severe measures are
unavailable or infeasible); David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, Social Policy
Towards Disability in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in THE HUMAN
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As long as the ECHR allows for the deprivation of liberty
exclusively on the grounds of being of “unsound mind,” it fails to
account for the paradigm shift that has taken place. Despite efforts to
apply international law and its eight guiding principles that clearly
protect the human rights of persons with intellectual and
psychosocial disabilities in Europe, the Court is still bound by article
5(1)(e) of the ECHR, making it impossible to successfully protect the
right to liberty.
This provision may allow States to deprive someone of their
liberty for a lifetime. Indeed, this is what happened to Valentin
Cȃmpeanu, a man with a severe intellectual disability, who was
abandoned at birth and spent his whole life living in social care
institutions.122 He suffered from other health problems, including
HIV, which made his condition and treatment more strenuous. 123 He
died after authorities placed him in a psychiatric hospital in the most
degrading conditions for one week. 124 He was found dead and alone
in a cold room, wearing only a pajamas top and lying in a bed
without bedding; although he was incapable of using the toilet or
feeding himself, the hospital staff refused to touch him for fear of
contracting HIV. 125 A case like this in the twenty-first century is
unacceptable. Yet, these situations are not exceptional in Europe. On
the contrary, many persons with intellectual and psychosocial
disabilities are abandoned in institutions and forgotten by the State,
society, and their families. This situation continues because the law
permits depriving a person’s liberty on the grounds of being of
“unsound mind” and State policy fails to provide alternatives to
depriving a person’s liberty.
The Court accounted for the heinous conditions that Valentin
suffered since birth, specifically the fact that his family abandoned
him and placed him into State “guardianship” until the end of his
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 83,
91-93 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003) (providing examples of the atrocious
“therapies,” such as the illegal and secret testing of radioactive elements on
patients at institutions in Massachusetts from 1946-1973).
122. See Câmpeanu v. Romania, App. No. 47848/08, para. 7 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July
17, 2014) (HUDOC), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.
aspx?i=001-113736#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-113736%22]}.
123. See id.
124. See id. para. 23.
125. Id.
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days. For the first time in the Court’s history, a non-governmental
organization (“NGO”) was allowed to file a petition on behalf of a
victim, despite the fact that the actual victim was deceased before the
proceedings began. 126 Although allowing an NGO to petition was a
significant step toward protecting the rights of people with
disabilities, unfortunately, the Court did not establish a clear standard
to apply in future cases. Instead, the Court assumed that this was an
exceptional situation. A concurring opinion argued that the Court
should have expanded the limits of the representation concept under
ECHR based on the equality principle, rather than taking a casuistic
approach. 127 Similarly, the dissenting opinion of Judges Spielmann,
Bianku, and Nussberger asserted that the Court missed an
opportunity to clarify locus standi for a NGO in connection with a
complaint on the basis of article 3 of the ECHR. 128
The right to liberty of persons with intellectual and psychosocial
disabilities is not distinct from other fundamental rights. This right is
the basis for protecting other human rights because depriving a
person’s liberty triggers a vicious circle of violating other rights,
such as the right to live within the community, the right to health, the
right to a private life, and the right to equality and nondiscrimination, among others.
The legal framework enforceable in the European System of
Human Rights clearly provides the rights that States must recognize
for persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities. Article 14
of CRPD explicitly establishes that “the existence of a disability shall
in no case justify a deprivation of liberty.” 129 The European Social
Charter states that disabled persons have the right to independence,
social integration, and participation in the life of the community. 130 It
also recognizes the right to be protected from social exclusion.131 The
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union protects the
126. Id. para. 112.
127. See id. (concurring opinion) (calling on the ECHR to provide a de facto
representation for those who are vulnerable).
128. Id. at 75 (Spielmann, J., Bianku, J., & Nusberger, J., dissenting).
129. CRPD, supra note 13, art. 14(1)(b).
130. See Revised European Social Charter, 1996, ETS 163, par. 15 (Part I) and
Art. 15 (Part II).
131. Id. art. 30 (requiring parties to take measures to ensure that individuals
who “live or risk living in a situation of social exclusion” are protected against
poverty).
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right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures to ensure
their independence, social and occupational integration, and
participation in the community. 132 While many legal frameworks
reflect the paradigm shift, the ECHR continues to lag behind.

VI. ADAPTING THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION TO
TODAY’S STANDARDS
As a legal instrument, the ECHR should be adapted to the social
context and circumstances of today. The ECtHR recognized that
ECHR is a living instrument and it must be interpreted in the light of
present-day conditions; indeed, the Council of Europe has amended
the ECHR by issuing protocols to the Convention. 133 The same
procedure should be followed to modify the ECHR and eliminate
article 5(1)(e) or, at the very least, the term “unsound mind” as a
ground to deprive a person of their right to liberty and respect the
principle of pacta sunt servanda. 134
Until this provision is amended, the ECtHR must desist from
applying this provision because it is contrary to jus cogens. This is
consistent with article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), which provides that a treaty is void
when it is contrary to a peremptory norm of international law. 135
Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR violates the principle of nondiscrimination, which is a principle included in the core human rights
instruments. 136
132. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Unions art. 26, Dec. 18,
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (establishing that persons with disabilities should have
measures in the European Union that ensure full social and occupational
independence and integration).
133. See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1978)
(“The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which, as
the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day
conditions.”).
134. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 332-33 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.”).
135. See id. art. 53 (prohibiting treaties that conflict with peremptory norms).
136. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, art.7,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (providing that all individuals are equal
under the law and shall not face discrimination); Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art
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In particular, the Preamble of the CRPD significantly emphasizes
equality and human dignity as fundamental values and principles of
human rights. 137 This Convention further recognizes the diversity of
persons with disabilities and that discrimination against any person
on the basis of disability is a violation of the inherent dignity and
worth of the human person. 138
Therefore, using the phrase “persons of unsound mind” in article
5(1)(e) of the ECHR as the sole basis to deprive someone of their
right to liberty is contrary to the internationally recognized principle
of non-discrimination. According to article 38(c) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, general principles are a source of
international law. 139 They have significant value because they are the
foundations of any legal system and fulfill the aspirations of
1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) (defining “torture” as “any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person . . . for any reason based on discrimination of any kind . . . .”);
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/44/736 (Nov. 20, 1989) (proscribing discrimination against children in any
form); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/6173 (Dec. 20, 1965)
(defining and condemning racial discrimination); Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, arts. 1-2 , U.N.
Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 13, 1979) (banning any form of discrimination against
women); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, arts. 2-3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981) (prohibiting discrimination based on religion);
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/45/158
(Dec. 18, 1990) (affirming the rights and equality of all migrant workers);
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 20
C/Res.3/1.1/2, arts. 4-6, 20th Sess. (1978), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.1,
annex V (1982) (outlining the value of culture and implementing articles to prevent
political, economic, and social intolerance); Equal Remuneration Convention (ILO
No. 100), June 29, 1951,165 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force May 23, 1953)
(requiring equal remuneration for men and women workers); Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, art. 1, December 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93, 96 (Dec.
14, 1960) (restricting discrimination for education); Discrimination (Employment
and Occupation) Convention (ILO No. 111), June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31
(entered into force June 15, 1960) (protecting the rights of labor organizations).
137. CRPD, supra note 13, pmbl. (a)-(c) (reflecting the United Nations Charter,
Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Human Rights).
138. Id. pmbl. (h), (i).
139. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute] (providing the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations).
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humankind as a whole. 140 The principle of non-discrimination
constitutes jus cogens because the international community as a
whole accepts and recognizes it and no derogation is permitted. 141
Being part of jus cogens implies that judges must apply this norm
even when it is contrary to a law established by a State in a treaty. 142
As these norms are peremptory, judges do not need the consent of
the parties to apply jus cogens and may apply it directly proprio
motu. 143 Therefore, within the meaning of articles 69(1) 144 and
71(1)(a) 145 of the Vienna Convention, a provision contrary to jus
cogens has no force and States shall eliminate the consequences of
any act performed in reliance of such a provision.
Human rights law must move at a faster pace to effectively protect
the rights of persons in the twenty-first century. Human dignity and
jus cogens are above any other source of law. States and judges must
actively promote and guarantee human rights by refraining to apply
the law whenever it is unclear or contrary to jus cogens and the nondiscrimination principle. The superiority of human dignity and jus
cogens are consequence of the humanization of international law,
which aims to identify and realize the common superior values and
goals of our society. 146 Provided that a disability is a social
140. See ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
HUMANKIND: TOWARDS A NEW JUST GENTIUM 311 (2010) (referencing the formal
sources of international law).
141. See CRPD, supra note 13, art. 5 (establishing that all parties shall
recognize the right of individuals to be free from discrimination and mandating
parties take steps to prevent discrimination); Vienna Convention, supra note 134,
art. 53 (requiring the invalidation of treaties that violate preemptory norms of
international law).
142. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants,
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 101 (Sept. 17,
2003) (acknowledging fundamental principles that permeate all laws); ALEXANDER
ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 495 (2006)
(stating that jus cogens norms are peremptory over any State-made law).
143. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 142, at 495-96 (arguing that judges
must enforce jus cogens even if the parties do not raise the matter).
144. See Vienna Convention, supra note 134, art. 69(1) (“A treaty the
invalidity of which is established under the present Convention is void. The
provisions of a void treaty have no legal force.”).
145. Id. art. 71(1)(a) (“Eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act
performed in reliance on any provision which conflicts with the peremptory norm
of general international law”).
146. See CRPD, supra note 13, pmbl. (a)-(c) (recognizing the United Nations
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construction, governments must improve their public policies to
enable persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities to
equally enjoy the same rights and opportunities as other citizens. 147

VII. CONCLUSION
Isolation and segregation are not the answer. They have never
been. These degrading mechanisms are only used to avoid
confronting a difficult reality that requires compassionate, strong,
and consistent public policies. An individual with an intellectual or
psychosocial disability is as much of a person as any other person. It
took society decades to admit that a disability is a social construction
and mark the beginning of the paradigm shift. Despite the progress, it
is essential to continue eliminating the barriers, both physical and
legislative, that prevent individuals from fully integrating into
society to achieve the real paradigm shift. 148

formation documents and treaties reflect jus cogens norms); see also I.C.J. Statute,
supra note 139, art. 38(c); CANÇADO TRINDADE, supra note 140, at 311 (arguing
that, in the name of progress of international human rights law, the doctrine of jus
cogens must override state autonomy).
147. See Marcia H. Rioux, On Second Thought: Constructing Knowledge, Law,
Disability, and Inequality, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 287, 312-13 (Stanley S. Herr
et al. eds., 2003) (using the examples of the ECHR and the Children’s Treaty to
show that international treaties are generally required to ensure various human
rights).
148. See Robert Silverstein, Statutory Changes in Disability Policy: Types of
Legislation, Policies, and Goals, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 263, 279-80 (Stanley S. Herr
et al. eds., 2003) (concluding that governments must eliminate the barriers that
prevent individuals with disabilities from participating in society at large).

